Britain's Continental Connection and the Peace of Amiens: a Reassessment by Callister, Graeme
Callister, Graeme (2021) Britain's
Continental Connection and the Peace of Amiens: a Reassessment.
International History Review.  
Downloaded from: http://ray.yorksj.ac.uk/id/eprint/5342/
The version presented here may differ from the published version or version of record. If 
you intend to cite from the work you are advised to consult the publisher's version:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2021.1972027
Research at York St John (RaY) is an institutional repository. It supports the principles of 
open access by making the research outputs of the University available in digital form. 
Copyright of the items stored in RaY reside with the authors and/or other copyright 
owners. Users may access full text items free of charge, and may download a copy for 
private study or non-commercial research. For further reuse terms, see licence terms 
governing individual outputs. Institutional Repository Policy Statement
RaY
Research at the University of York St John 
For more information please contact RaY at ray@yorksj.ac.uk
Britain’s Continental Connection and the Peace of Amiens:
A Reassessment
Graeme Callister
History, York St John University, York, UK
ABSTRACT
The Treaty of Amiens, which brought an end to almost a decade of
Franco-British warfare in March 1802, has long been understood as a
flawed attempt at peace making. The British government’s surrender of
most of its wartime colonial acquisitions, combined with a failure to
push for guarantees on the Continent, has been interpreted as a meek
acquiescence in France’s domination over Western Europe. The recom-
mencement of war in May 1803 simply seems to confirm the suppos-
ition that the treaty was fundamentally inadequate. This article
questions that interpretation by examining Britain’s relations with and
policies towards Europe, and above all towards the Netherlands, during
the period of negotiation and subsequent peace, 1800-3. It suggests
that the British government did not conceive Amiens as the surrender
of key interests, but as a base from which British influence could be
reasserted. By looking at the context of Britain’s historical connections
to the Netherlands, their experience of previous periods of relative dip-
lomatic isolation, and the wider framework of European treaties, it is
shown that British ministers had every reason to believe that the Treaty
of Amiens left Britain in a reasonably strong position to limit
French dominance.
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The Peace of Amiens, 1802-3, is generally considered as little more than a brief and unsatisfac-
tory pause in the two-decade long conflict between Britain and republican and Napoleonic
France that lasted from 1793 to 1815. The definitive peace treaty was signed in March 1802, and
ruptured by Britain’s declaration of war on France in May the following year. Most of those four-
teen months of peace were fraught with continued and growing tensions between the two prin-
cipal powers. For historians of Britain the peace has traditionally attracted little positive
comment, and often provides little more than a convenient delineation between the wars of the
Revolution and those of Napoleon. At best, Amiens has been viewed as a flawed attempt to con-
ciliate a French regime whose ambitions knew few reasonable bounds, leaving Britain isolated
and excluded from the Continent.2 Even those who would argue that Amiens created a reason-
able global balance of power – such as Paul Schroeder or Charles Esdaile – maintain that
Britain’s acceptance of continental exclusion was an integral part of both making and keeping
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the peace.3 For many, the treaty represented weakness on the part of Britain’s rulers. Henry
Addington is often dismissed as a soft prime minister and Lord Hawkesbury as a weak foreign
secretary, despite their later successes, and Amiens has garnered inevitable comparisons with the
appeasement at Munich in 1938.4 Despite some revisionist rehabilitations of British policy and its
makers, notably in the works of Charles Fedorak, John Grainger, or Thomas Goldsmith, the nega-
tive interpretation of Amiens still holds general sway.5
This article will question the negative view of the treaty, and will suggest that the peace
made at Amiens afforded Britain a stronger diplomatic position in continental affairs than is gen-
erally credited. While the treaty certainly reflected Britain’s relative lack of success in the war
compared to France by 1801, it did not represent a diplomatic surrender or, as Roger Knight
would have it, ‘a one-sided French diplomatic triumph’.6 The article will demonstrate this by
focusing on Britain’s relations with the Netherlands – once Britain’s closest friend, but by 1801 a
revolutionised ally of the French Republic. It will show that although the letter of the treaty
reflected a pragmatic acceptance that France could not be shifted from the Low Countries by
force or negotiation, which has been interpreted as Britain abandoning the Netherlands to its
fate, London actually believed that peace would assure Dutch independence, which in their view
would lead to a resurgence of the natural close connection between Britain and the Netherlands
severed by the recent war. In this belief the Cabinet was encouraged by the international treaties
that bound France and the Netherlands together by 1801, and by the attitudes of the Dutch
government both before and after the signing of the treaty. If placed in a wider context of exist-
ing treaties and Britain’s recent experience of diplomatic resurgence after the American War, the
Treaty of Amiens can be seen as providing a solid foundation for the reestablishment of British
interests in Europe. The article will further show that the descent towards renewed conflict from
November 1802 saw more overt British attempts to limit French control over the Netherlands, at
once demonstrating that Britain by no means acquiesced to French hegemony in Western
Europe, and that Addington’s government ultimately rejected appeasement as a method of con-
taining Napoleon.
One general criticism of the treaty is that the concessions were mostly one-sided, with Britain
returning most of its colonial gains in exchange for relatively illusory guarantees on the contin-
ent.7 Indeed, when comparing the peace agreement to the objects for which Britain ostensibly
entered the war in 1793, the island nation was a clear loser. While the origins of the conflict lay
largely in traditional Anglo-French rivalry and British distrust of France’s new republican regime,
the immediate trigger for hostilities was the French threat to the River Scheldt and to Britain’s
primary ally on the continent, the United Provinces of the Netherlands. The war not only led to
the French conquest of the Netherlands in 1795, but saw the pro-British Stadholderate over-
thrown and the country revolutionised as the Batavian Republic. A major expedition to ‘liberate’
the Netherlands and restore the British alliance in 1799 proved an ignominious failure, crushing
hopes of driving the French out of the Low Countries by force. By the time Addington’s adminis-
tration replaced that of William Pitt in March 1801, Britain had been compelled to abandon any
hope of achieving by force the object for which it initially went to war.
The issue of the restoration of British influence in the Netherlands certainly remained a long
way from the negotiating table at Amiens. Britain in fact allowed France to dodge almost all
questions of the Continental settlement, instead consenting to France’s desire to make peace
based almost entirely on colonial and Mediterranean concerns. This has led many commentators
to see Amiens as an acceptance by Britain of France’s dominance over Western Europe.
Schroeder, in his thought-provoking treatment of evolving European politics in the period 1763-
1848, argued that ‘Britain in 1800-2, would… have tacitly consented to a peaceful, non-expan-
sionist French hegemony in Western Europe’, which would have formed part of a ‘real balance
of power’, with ‘France dominant in Western Europe, Britain on the seas, and Russia in Eastern
Europe’.8 Others who might perhaps be more wary of accepting Schroeder’s conception of bal-
ance nonetheless accept the premise that it signalled Britain’s exclusion from the Continent. Not
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only was this the case with the settlements of Italy and Switzerland – areas in which Britain was
interested mostly for reasons of limiting French power – but also of the Low Countries, which
had for well over a century been an area of significant strategic sensitivity and therefore great
intrinsic value to Britain. This, above all, is seen as signalling Britain’s exclusion from European
affairs. David Gates, for example, asserted that Britain had to ‘acquiesce in France’s virtual control
of Holland’, while Paul Kennedy stated that ‘London was firmly told to keep out’ of Dutch and
wider European affairs.9
It is not the intention of this article to dispute the factual accuracy of such assertions – after
all, the texts of both the Preliminaries in 1801 and the definitive treaty in 1802 clearly elided
questions of continental influence – but instead to question the extent to which this signalled
Britain’s acceptance, tacit or otherwise, of exclusion from the affairs of mainland Europe. In this,
the current article differs somewhat from existing interpretations. Contrary, for example, to
Esdaile’s assertion that ‘British interest in the Continent had been set aside’ at Amiens, and that
the peace gave France ‘an unassailable sphere of influence in Holland, Switzerland and Italy’, this
article will demonstrate that London in fact had every expectation that the peace would allow
Britain to begin to re-establish its continental influence, especially in the Netherlands.10 In this it
supports Goldsmith’s recent contention that during both negotiations and the period of peace
Britain remained firmly focused on Europe.11 The present article will expand upon this argument
by focusing specifically on Britain’s relations with and attitudes towards the Netherlands during
the period of negotiation and peace between 1800 and 1803. It will be argued here that the
Treaty of Amiens must be understood in the context of Britain’s historical connections with
the Netherlands, the ingrained understandings of British politicians of those connections, and
the experience of previous moments of apparent isolation, predominantly that following the
Peace of Paris in 1783. In such a context, Amiens represented not the acceptance of exclusion,
but a basis from which elements of British influence could be quickly and firmly rebuilt.
Amiens was therefore not, as some would suggest, feeble surrender to French dominance.
Nor indeed was it appeasement of French expansionism. By 1801 it was clear that force of arms
had failed to erode France’s stranglehold on the continent, and that continued conflict would
only serve to strengthen French influence. Each coalition brought against France had only
afforded more scope for French conquest, and the ongoing war provided the justification for
France’s continued occupation of neighbouring states. By the Treaty of the Hague (1795)
between France and the Batavian Republic, for example, French troops would be stationed in
the Netherlands until the return of peace, ostensibly for protection, but in reality giving France
enormous influence over the Dutch government for as long as the conflict continued. Giving
peace a chance was therefore not only a way of allowing Britain a period to recover from the
exertions of nearly a decade of warfare, but also presented the most realistic prospect of limiting
French influence and affording Britain the opportunity to reclaim some of her former position.
A difficulty with assessing Britain’s diplomacy in the period 1800-3 is the change of adminis-
tration in March 1801. The influence of personality on policy has been increasingly recognised in
studies of early modern diplomacy, and that influence should be acknowledged here.12 The
change of government led to some significant alterations in the approach of the prime minister
and foreign secretary. Addington and Hawkesbury, who respectively replaced Pitt as prime minis-
ter and Lord William Grenville as foreign secretary, were believed to be more conciliatory, per-
sonable and even less duplicitous than their predecessors.13 They were also perhaps less
personally invested in supporting the Prince of Orange, the ousted Stadholder of the
Netherlands, and certainly did not share Pitt’s ‘craze’ for operations in that country.14 However,
there remained a high degree of continuity in the longer-term trends, principles and perceptions
in British policy. Pitt and Grenville kept their successors fully informed of their earlier projects,
making available not only official correspondence, but the plans and ideas that had underpinned
their thinking.15 Much of the diplomatic corps and wider Foreign Office personnel also remained
in place, from undersecretary George Hammond downwards, and the advice of experienced
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diplomats was readily available to the new Cabinet. Addington, for example, corresponded regu-
larly with the Earl of Malmesbury, who was not only an elder statesman of British foreign affairs
but had, as Britain’s representative to the Netherlands in the 1780s, effectively masterminded a
key plank of Britain’s diplomatic resurgence after the American War. Hawkesbury, although
young and inexperienced by comparison to Grenville, dined regularly with Pitt during his time as
foreign secretary, and benefited greatly from the former prime minister’s advice.16 And above it
all was George III, a moderating and stable influence, even if he was increasingly content for pol-
icy to be set and executed by his ministers. While Addington and Hawkesbury certainly placed
their own stamp on events, they did so within a tried and traditional policy framework.
1
The Netherlands is a particularly pertinent subject of interest when discussing the peace making
at Amiens because it was deemed so crucial to British security, prosperity and presence on the
continent. In strategic terms, the deep-water ports and river estuaries of the Netherlands pro-
vided some of the few anchorages on the North Sea or Channel coast that could potentially
shelter hostile battle fleets or invasion flotillas. With the Scheldt estuary sitting only 150 miles
from London, the country represented a ‘cocked pistol’ aimed at the head of Britain.17
Preventing the coastal littoral of the Low Countries falling into enemy hands had therefore been
a crucial part of British policy throughout the eighteenth century. Moreover, the importance of
the Netherlands as an entrepôt for British trade and a source of intelligence from the Continent
was enormous. It is instructive that between 1786 and the French invasion of 1795, Britain spent
more annually on their embassy in the Netherlands than on any other aside from France and
Spain.18 In early 1793 Lord Auckland, British ambassador in the Hague, demanded that Britain
should defend the Netherlands as if it were a part of Yorkshire, to which Pitt replied that ‘we
consider the cause of Holland so much our own, that we are ready to fight the battle there as
we should be at our own doors’, before announcing in Parliament that a French threat to the
Low Countries was a threat to Britain herself.19 The French conquest of 1795 and the subsequent
realignment of Dutch allegiance did little to change this view in Britain, although anxiety over
French control of the Netherlands was widespread.20 An expedition was proposed in 1796 to
launch spoiling attacks against Dutch shipping to prevent it from being used as a tool of France,
while Admiral Adam Duncan’s victory over the Batavian battle fleet at Camperdown the follow-
ing year was rapturously received across Great Britain.21 The failure of Anglo-French peace nego-
tiations in 1796 and 1797 came largely as a result of irreconcilable differences over French
control of the Low Countries. The great invasion of the Netherlands in 1799 was intended partly
to demonstrate British commitment to the Second Coalition, but mostly to remove a key stra-
tegic area from the enemy’s grasp by reinstalling a friendly government or, failing that, to render
it useless as a potential weapon against Britain.22
The failure of this expedition ended British hopes of removing French influence from the
Netherlands by force of arms, and the wider collapse of the coalition meant that by the summer
of 1800 the cabinet was already contemplating coming to terms with France. However, it is evi-
dent that the Netherlands was still very much on their minds. Grenville, then still foreign secre-
tary, was keen to ensure Britain’s strategic position in relation to the Low Countries, suggesting
that if a suitable settlement could be reached ‘we ought to give up part of our conquests in
compensation of whatever security we obtain on the side of Holland’.23 The apparent failure of
Britain’s negotiators to provide for this security has been central to many criticisms of Amiens.
Yet it was never the case that Britain simply wanted to clear French troops from the
Netherlands. Since 1795 Britain’s firm aim had been the overthrow of the Dutch revolutionary
regime and the re-establishment of the generally Anglophile Stadholderate under the House of
Orange. This had been at the heart of all talk of ‘liberating’ the country, and had been seen as
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the best guarantee of long-term stability. However, it was not an object for which Britain was
willing to prolong the war indefinitely. The abortive peace negotiations of 1797 had seen
Grenville flirt with abandoning this aim, although he had ultimately shied away from doing so.24
As peace talks became a realistic possibility in 1800, however, a cabinet minute admitted that
‘with respect to Holland, it does not appear probable, that any sacrifice we could make would
induce France to restore the Stadholder, and to place the government decidedly in his hands;
nor would that arrangement be secure or permanent unless the independence of… [Belgium]
was satisfactorily provided for.’25 This latter would be unlikely without a significant blow being
dealt to French forces on the Continent, but Austria’s recent defeat at Marengo and reluctance
to continue the fray despite the British alliance made that a more remote possibility. The French
victory at Hohenlinden in December 1800 and subsequent Austro-French Treaty of Luneville left
France undisputed control of Belgium, and removed any lingering hopes that pressure could be
brought to bear regarding the form of Dutch government. The abandonment of any hope for or
even discussion of the restoration of the Orangist regime was perhaps the real concession
regarding the Netherlands at Amiens.
This does not mean, however, that Britain had abandoned hope of obtaining influence and
security in the Netherlands at the peace. For Addington’s cabinet, any treaty with France to end
their current conflict would be only part of a mesh of international agreements that bound the
conduct of the powers of Europe. As negotiations began, the British government had every rea-
son to expect that the lack of specific clauses concerning the Batavian Republic in either the pre-
liminaries or at Amiens would result in Franco-Dutch relations being regulated by their bilateral
treaties of 1795 and 1801, which guaranteed Dutch independence and stipulated that French
troops should be withdrawn once a general peace had been concluded, and by Luneville, which
provided an international guarantee of the independence of the Batavian Republic.26 Once
French troops had been removed from the Netherlands, it was assumed, the Dutch government
would have much greater freedom of action both internally and externally. Moreover, the Dutch
coast would appear a much less threatening place if manned by only Dutch troops and ships,
partly because of the damage done to the Dutch fleets at Camperdown in 1797 and the Helder
in 1799, and partly because of the apparent growing ambivalence of the Dutch government to
their French connection. With no lever with which to prise French forces from the Low
Countries, and no realistic prospect of gaining concessions in peace talks, leaving Franco-Dutch
relations to be regulated by treaties that guaranteed Dutch independence seemed to be the
best course of action.
There were, of course, many other considerations weighing on British minds in the discussions
of the preliminaries and in the peace talks at Amiens that precluded further discussion of the
Dutch situation. While the notion of balance of power was seemingly thrown out of the window
by France’s domination of Italy, Switzerland, western Germany and the Low Countries, Britain
had gained an unprecedented mastery of the waves during the years of war. In Schroeder’s view
this effectively left French overseas possessions as vulnerable to Britain as the continent seemed
vulnerable to France, and was, therefore, a genuine balance – although it should be added that
this balance could only be enforced by retaliation elsewhere in the world, rather than by any sys-
tem limiting expansionism in the first place.27 Moreover, Britain’s leaders seemed implicitly aware
that their naval and colonial predominance would not be looked upon favourably by other
powers. The northern powers’ League of Armed Neutrality and the contretemps with Russia in
1801 would have brought this point home rather forcefully. Although Hawkesbury made it clear
to Louis-Guillaume Otto, the French representative during talks for the preliminaries of peace,
that Britain would seek compensation in the colonies in exchange for French gains on the con-
tinent, it is also apparent that the cabinet understood the necessity of returning colonial cap-
tures and of the diminution of their dominance in this sphere, as well as the need to show
moderation regarding Egypt and Malta, if they wished to maintain the good opinion of
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Europe.28 There was therefore perhaps less scope for British negotiators to demand concessions
than may be imagined.
There were also significant concerns in Britain about the sincerity and stability of the French
government. Although some Britons exalted the First Consul as the saviour of France and the
peacemaker of Europe, most from the king downwards held him in a degree of distrust. George
III only grudgingly agreed to the signing of preliminaries with France in 1801, cautioning that
while he would welcome peace, he could not ‘place any reliance on its duration’ due to the
instability of French government.29 Charles Yorke, Secretary at War under Addington, was of a
similar mind to his monarch, writing that Napoleon had ‘the great qualities of a great villain and
successful robber, and no other; and in the present state of France, I would not give a twelve-
month’s purchase for any peace, however fair upon the face of it, that can be had with it.’30
Anthony Merry, Britain’s representative in Paris during the preliminaries, warned in October 1801
of the ‘cunning’ of the First Consul and Talleyrand, adding that any good understanding would
prove difficult, as ‘they think they may trample with impunity upon the whole world.’31 There
were perhaps few doubts in Britain that France meant to make peace, but significant misgivings
about whether she meant to keep it. In February 1802 Hawkesbury wrote somewhat morosely to
Marquess Charles Cornwallis, his chief negotiator at Amiens, that ‘they have an evident policy in
concluding the definitive treaty, even if they are determined to break it in the course of
six months’.32
There was, throughout, a lack of trust between the British government and their French coun-
terparts. French exterior minister, Charles Maurice Talleyrand, was universally despised for his
supposed ‘spirit of chicanery and intrigue’, with Cornwallis privately dismissing him as a man
‘devoid of honour and principle’.33 Before negotiations even began Hawkesbury warned
Cornwallis of the need for caution, writing that Talleyrand ‘is a person who is likely to take every
unfair advantage in conducting business with others’, and the British delegation certainly wel-
comed the choice of the ‘well-meaning, but not very able’ Joseph Bonaparte to lead the negotia-
tions on behalf of France.34 Cornwallis nevertheless complained throughout about what he saw
as the duplicitousness of the French negotiators, writing to Hawkesbury less than a month into
talks that ‘in no instance is there any show of candour in the negotiations’.35 He felt especially
aggrieved that despite receiving the personal promise of the First Consul that France would
acquiesce in George III’s earnest desire to secure suitable compensation for the Prince of Orange,
French negotiators constantly placed obstacles in the way in order to wring greater concessions
from Britain.36 The blame for the inconstancy of French demands was ultimately laid at the feet
of the First Consul. John Grainger has in fact suggested that this very inconstancy pushed
Hawkesbury to seek peace on relatively narrow terms, omitting issues of some importance in
order to avoid being caught up in ‘Bonapartist flummery’.37 Napoleon’s fundamental lack of
trustworthiness seemed to be underlined by the manoeuvring that saw him effectively seize the
presidency of Italy in early 1802, even as negotiations continued at Amiens. Hawkesbury railed
against ‘the inordinate ambition, the gross breach of faith, and the inclination to insult Europe,
manifested by the conduct of the First Consul on this occasion’, but had little choice but to con-
tinue with negotiations or take the almost impossible choice of renewing the war.38
Britain’s lack of continental leverage, acceptance of the need for colonial balance, and funda-
mental distrust of Napoleon and his consular regime, all contributed to the lack of any firm
demands concerning the Netherlands at Amiens. This was clearly a climbdown from previous
negotiating positions, and such an approach was not universally accepted. Some commentators,
amongst them Louis XVI’s former minister Charles de Calonne, believed that the new French
regime would be willing to accept the return of the Stadholderate, and advised Addington to
push for such a project.39 Influential former ministers, including William Windham, George
Canning and even Grenville himself remained wary of a peace that in their view did not provide
for security, while the vocal William Cobbett would lambast Addington and Hawkesbury as the
treaty was signed for having ‘connived at a subjugation’ of Holland.40 However, even Pitt and
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Grenville accepted the reality of French control, and were content to leave the fate of the
Netherlands off the negotiating table. This did not, however, mean that they or their successors
had simply accepted permanent French dominance of the Low Countries, despite the views of
the treaty’s contemporary detractors.
The effect of Britain’s stance in the preliminaries and at Amiens was to leave the Netherlands
ostensibly under French thrall, but it also ensured that Britain was not compelled to accept expli-
cit French dominance of the country in any treaty. Indeed, the only demand that Britain made
was that the Netherlands should accede to the negotiations as a full signatory power, demon-
strating the country’s continued independence on the world stage. This was generally consistent
with the approach of 1796-7, when Britain insisted that France should not be permitted to nego-
tiate on behalf of the Dutch government.41 In abortive negotiations in September 1800, Grenville
demanded that Spain and the Netherlands ‘if regarded by France as independent, cannot be
bound by her act; and must be admitted as contracting parties acceding by a regular diplomatic
transaction to the terms of the armistice’.42 The inclusion of Spain here indicates that Grenville
clearly had every expectation that the countries were independent powers. Once negotiations
for a definitive treaty began in late 1801, Britain again repeatedly insisted that the Netherlands
must participate as an equal power, despite attempts by the French government to exclude the
Dutch plenipotentiary, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, from talks.43 Hawkesbury instructed
Cornwallis at Amiens to base his demands on the fact that the Netherlands must agree to the
cession of colonies to Britain, but it was also a clear indication that Britain had no intention of
accepting the Netherlands’ status as a French vassal.
The insistence on the Netherlands acting as an independent power was more than mere dip-
lomatic form. Taking the Cabinet’s instructions at face value, it may have simply been a device
to ensure the legality of Britain’s colonial gains. However, it also set an implicit limit on France’s
influence. With the Netherlands recognised as a fully independent state, enshrined in inter-
national treaty, France could have no reason for reneging on its commitments to remove its
forces at the establishment of general peace. Any failure on this score could be the subject of
legitimate international recrimination. Any further interference in Dutch internal affairs by France
would also become a point of international concern, therefore allowing Britain to exert some
moderating influence. Moreover, Britain’s leaders had every expectation that peace and the
removal of France’s forces from the Netherlands should lead to a much closer understanding
with that power, and would offer scope for patient British diplomacy to draw the country gently
away from the French alliance.
This expectation came partly from the experience of the diplomatic manoeuvrings of 1785-7
that had overthrown an earlier Franco-Dutch accord and re-established British primacy, and
partly from the fact that, even as peace talks progressed, the Dutch government seemed anxious
to reignite friendly relations with Britain. The first of these experiences had demonstrated that a
French presence in the Netherlands could be rapidly undermined by leaning on the supposedly
natural Anglo-Dutch connection, and provides an instructive example of the limitations of peace
treaties in determining the balance of power. It is therefore worth examining in a little
more depth.
In the aftermath of the American War and subsequent peace with France, Spain, and the
Netherlands (1783-4), Britain had seemed alone in Europe, and bereft of both friends and influ-
ence on the Continent. Only Denmark seemed inclined to cordial relations.44 Of the major
powers, France and Spain remained hostile, Russia uninterested, Prussia wary and more inclined
to a rapprochement with France, and Austria a French ally. The Netherlands, Britain’s closest
friend on the continent for nigh-on a century, seemed to have abandoned their cause after
being pushed into the war against Britain in 1780, and concluded a defensive alliance with
France in 1785. From Britain’s point of view, therefore, the immediate situation appeared dire.
However, by 1788 Britain had achieved a sea change in the political face of Europe. By dint of
diplomatic skill, the disbursement of secret service funds, and reliance on the supposedly
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‘natural’ predilection of the Dutch people for a British connection, Britain’s ambassador, Sir
James Harris (later raised to be Earl of Malmesbury), was quickly able to build up a substantial
counterweight to French influence in the Netherlands. Although this was not enough in itself to
overthrow the French-backed Patriot party, his actions placed significant strain on the Franco-
Dutch connection. With secret British encouragement, a number of provinces effectively with-
drew their support for the French alliance, and significant portions of the army were induced to
follow suit. By 1787, London had managed to draw Prussia into an accord through their mutual
desire to promote the interests of the House of Orange in the Netherlands. Prussian military
intervention, combined with a threat of British naval mobilisation that kept France quiescent,
saw the overthrow of the pro-French party and the restoration of the pro-British Stadholder to
fuller control in the autumn of that year.45 Treaties of alliance signed with Prussia and the
Netherlands in 1788 completed the diplomatic volte face, leaving France isolated and humiliated,
and restoring to Britain a degree of continental security apparently lost in the peace making
of 1783.46
While there is no indication that Addington’s government planned to imitate 1787 in any
detail – which would in any case have been precluded by changed circumstance – the example
of so recent an event could hardly have been missed, and suggests that Britain’s leaders would
by no means have conceived Amiens as the slamming of the continental door in Britain’s face.
Instead, it was an opportunity to rebuild crumbling relations, especially in the Netherlands. This
was even more the case as in 1802 it was believed that even many of those in the Dutch gov-
ernment who had supported France fifteen years earlier had abandoned that position. Although
in 1787 it had ultimately taken a Prussian army to ‘cut the Gordian knot’ of the Anglo-French (or
Orangist-Patriot) standoff in Britain’s favour by removing the pro-French party from power, this
was not believed to be necessary in 1802.47 It was generally believed that the Dutch govern-
ment, as much as the people, now wished for nothing more than to be rid of the French alli-
ance. The focus on colonial and Mediterranean issues at Amiens allowed London to believe that
the peacetime situation in the Low Countries would be defined by earlier treaties, which clearly
stipulated the independence of the Netherlands. Britain could also hope for the good offices of
the other major powers, and especially of Austria, to ensure that the provisions of Luneville were
respected and that the Netherlands was freed from French occupation. Moreover, as in 1787,
Britain had an expectation that the internal instability of France would work in Britain’s favour
by paralysing any effective French riposte.
It is not suggested that during negotiations Britain had a master plan to launch a diplomatic
counter-offensive before the ink on the treaty was dry – it did not, just as it had not after 1783
– but simply that previous experience afforded much more reason for London to retain hopes
for the restoration of continental influence than most commentators on the Treaty of Amiens
will credit. The belief that British influence would grow quickly once French forces were with-
drawn and placed on a peace footing was based, in 1802 as much as in 1787, on the notion
that the majority of people in the Netherlands favoured Britain over France. In 1787 it was
widely believed that the restoration of the House of Orange showed that the majority of the
Dutch population were firmly committed to Britain, as ‘nothing but the great concurrence of
the people’ could have led to the success of the scheme.48 The assumption that this remained
the case was also crucial to Britain’s understanding of the Netherlands at the time of Amiens.
Although the failure of an expected anti-French uprising in 1799 had somewhat dented
British faith in Dutch Anglophilia, ministers ultimately retained their conviction that the
Netherlands was a natural British ally.49 This was bolstered by intelligence received from the
Netherlands over the next two years, which painted a picture of a country thoroughly fed up
with the French alliance. Even before the signing of the preliminaries in 1801 Addington and
Hawkesbury received regular assurances that the Dutch despised the ‘despotism and extortions’
of the French forces in their country.50 As soon as the preliminaries were signed in October 1801
the Batavian government moved to issue trading licences to British merchants in order to restore
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their commercial connections, and requested that London reciprocate.51 Once the representa-
tives of the belligerent powers met at Amiens, the British delegates frequently received hints of
significant cracks in the Franco-Dutch entente. On 20 November Edward Littlehales, Cornwallis’s
private secretary, wrote to inform Addington following a dinner with Schimmelpenninck that the
Dutch representative ‘deprecated strongly the conduct of the current rulers of France towards
Holland’.52 A month later Cornwallis reported an even more frank exchange with his Dutch coun-
terpart. As Schimmelpenninck was still being blocked from joining the negotiations by a petty
technicality on the part of the French government, he sought out Cornwallis to make direct rep-
resentations to Britain on behalf of his government. After commencing with complaints about
the ‘humiliating situation’ in which he found himself, and expressing ‘confidence in the favour-
able disposition of the British cabinet to allow of such discussions’, Schimmelpenninck offered
‘some very strong invective against the French government, when he proceeded to assure me,
that… there was not a man in Holland more desirous than he was of emancipating his country
from the yoke of France, as well, as of forming a close connexion with Great Britain’.53
Such rhetoric on Schimmelpenninck’s part may have been exaggerated in order to press his
claim for restitution of Dutch property lost to Britain during the war, but it seems to have
impressed Cornwallis. The latter certainly saw it as a friendly overture and, although coy on the
restoration of property, assured Schimmelpenninck that he hoped ‘that the time might still
come, when, for the interests of both states, we should see Holland again independent, and her
former intimate connexion with Great Britain renewed.’54 This hope was echoed in London. In
early January 1802, for example, Addington noted happily that ‘the Batavian govern-
ment… appears desirous of cultivating a good understanding with our own’, which he hoped
would be helped by a Batavian agreement to offer compensation to the deposed Prince of
Orange.55 In Cornwallis’s view any lack of enthusiasm from the Dutch delegation at Amiens to
grant British wishes came from their need to play a part, as ‘Schimmelpenninck, whatever his pri-
vate sentiments may be, can only appear at a meeting of the plenipotentiaries as an humble
and dependant ally of France’.56
The continued friendliness of the Dutch delegation throughout the months at Amiens rein-
forced the impression that the restoration of the once-close Anglo-Dutch relationship would be
possible, if not probable, upon the return of peace and stability. Despite Britain’s insistence on
retaining Dutch settlements in Ceylon and refusal to countenance returning Dutch property
seized with dubious legality at the outbreak of war, Schimmelpenninck continued to show an
earnest desire to place Anglo-Dutch relations back on a firm footing.57 He seemed, said
Cornwallis, ‘more apprehensive of encroachments on the part of France than of England’, and
continually expressed the desire ‘to see a perfectly good understanding re-established’ between
Britain and the Netherlands.58 In late February Cornwallis, writing privately to his friend
Alexander Ross, expressed his belief that the Dutch ‘appear to like us much better than their
allies’.59 When the bartering between Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte neared an impasse in
mid-March 1802, Schimmelpenninck was able to act as a go-between, ensuring an outcome
acceptable to both parties and perhaps even preventing the breakdown of talks.60 Much of the
favourable impression on the British representatives could perhaps be ascribed to
Schimmelpenninck’s emollience and diplomatic skill, but it is clear that as quill was put to paper
on the definitive treaty of peace on 25 March, Cornwallis and indeed the British government had
no reason to believe that they were signing away any hope of rapidly recovering their influence
in the Netherlands.
2
Further evidence that Britain had not simply waved a white flag at Amiens can be found in an
examination of Britain’s diplomatic relations in the unfortunately brief peace that followed. It is
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clear from their actions that the British government saw the peace not as an end point leaving
them cut off from Western Europe, but as an opportunity to rebuild relations severed during the
years of war. The instructions to Lord Whitworth, sent to Paris as Britain’s ambassador in 1802,
made this clear: ‘You will… state most distinctly, His Majesty’s determination never to forgo his
right of interfering in the affairs of the continent… This right His Majesty possesses in common
with every other independent power; it rests upon general principles, and does not require the
confirmation of any particular treaty.’61 The same instructions were, however, equally adamant
that the Treaty of Amiens gave that right in any case, asserting that ‘the circumstances which
led to the conclusion of the last peace, and the principles upon which the negotiation was con-
ducted, would give His Majesty a special right to interfere in any case which might lead to the
extension of the power and influence of France.’ In the view of the cabinet, established diplo-
matic principles and practices gave Britain a continued right to an interest in continental
Europe.62 These principles perhaps precluded any openly expansionist acts, but it would be
expected that Britain would do its utmost to reignite former friendships. Indeed, the government
would have been criminally irresponsible to fail to attempt to bolster its position through peace-
time diplomacy, and the re-establishment of harmonious relations with France’s satellite states
arguably opened more doors than it closed in this regard. Kennedy averred that the Peace of
Amiens failed when it became obvious that ‘France was continuing the struggle by other means’,
but the same could perhaps also be said for Great Britain – albeit that the British government’s
attempts at reinforcing their influence were conducted within their understanding of the frame-
work of international diplomacy, whereas Napoleon’s were not.63
The attempt to separate the Netherlands from French hegemony was a key part of these dip-
lomatic machinations, showing that British decision makers had not resigned themselves to
exclusion from continental Western Europe in 1802, and that they were not ‘indifferent’ to the
fate of the Low Countries.64 This is not to argue that London had a grand plan to reclaim its lost
influence. The British government certainly had no strategy to coerce the Dutch into abandoning
their connection with France, as to do so would have left London open to recriminations on the
same principles that they would later use to accuse France of bad faith.65 Instead, experience
and expectations of Dutch character led ministers to hope for a natural and organic rapid
renewal of close relations with the Netherlands. Although the overthrow of the Prince of Orange
in 1795 had removed a key British supporter at the heart of the Dutch government, plenty of
men supposedly favouring a British connection could still be found in high office in the
Republic. It would be Britain’s policy to cultivate such connections without giving any impression
of partisanship, to support the Dutch case for the removal of French troops, and to re-establish
the commercial links that had been so important to relations in earlier periods. Above all,
Hawkesbury instructed his new Minister Plenipotentiary to the Hague in August 1802, Britain
wished ‘to see the Batavian Republic in fact what it is in name – independent’.66 The effect of
this, it was believed, would be to allow Britain to present itself as the protector of Dutch inter-
ests against the encroachments of France, and would wean the Netherlands slowly away from
the French alliance and bring them gently back into a British orbit.
This scheme was based on the understanding that the Dutch people’s natural inclination, and
the Netherlands’s national interests, lay with maritime Britain rather than continental France. The
restoration of past good relations was at the centre of Hawkesbury’s approach. The man chosen
to represent Britain in the Hague, and whose influence would be crucial in securing a good
understanding with the Dutch government and people, was Robert Liston, a Scottish diplomat
well regarded by Hawkesbury. Moreover, Liston was a long-term acquaintance of the Dutch for-
eign minister, Maarten van der Goes, with whom he quickly resumed a friendly relationship.67 In
Hawkesbury’s view Anglo-Dutch relations had long been based on a personal understanding
between British monarchs and the House of Orange, and although that connection was now
lost, he believed that there were plenty of partisans of Britain who should be persuaded to take
up posts in the Dutch government. The pro-French party was now ‘inconsiderable in numbers
10 G. CALLISTER
and influence’, he asserted, and so the time was ripe.68 Hawkesbury did not, however, assume
that France would look favourably on any Anglo-Dutch rapprochement. He recognised the deli-
cacy of the task at hand, and advised ‘great prudence and circumspection’ on Liston’s part when
supporting demands for the removal of French troops from the Netherlands.69 He also recog-
nised that a commercial treaty may prove difficult, especially while France maintained a military
presence in the Netherlands. Hawkesbury therefore suggested the practical solution of reactivat-
ing article ten of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1788, which had made the two countries favoured
trading partners.70 A commercial understanding would bring some economic benefit to Britain,
but was much more important as a means of cementing the good opinion of the Dutch com-
mercial classes.
Hawkesbury and Addington were encouraged in their views by the general attitude of the
Dutch government during the peace, and by continued intelligence from the Netherlands.
Within a couple of months of the signing of the definitive treaty, for example, the Batavian gov-
ernment was transacting business with Britain that it begged them to keep secret from France.71
London’s hope that adherents of the Orangist and British cause could reclaim their former influ-
ence was encouraged by the moderation shown to returning exiles such as Hendrick Fagel, the
former Greffier and close advisor of the Prince of Orange.72 Liston’s despatches from the Hague
certainly gave the impression that, like in 1787, French influence in the Netherlands could be
undermined and the British connection re-established. On arriving in the Netherlands in
September 1802, he cautioned that there remained a strong pro-French party, but that
it is evident that the great majority of the inhabitants, though not insensible to the happiness of present
peace and security, are dissatisfied with the new form of government, humiliated by the oppression and
disgusted by the pretended friendships of France, and that they look forward with longing eyes to the
possibility of a change that may bring back a state of friendship and union with Great Britain.73
He further adverted that his arrival had caused quite a stir, and that he had ‘been followed
by the huzzahs of the multitude’. He claimed that he had even had to check the ardour of the
Anglophile Orangists lest their excitement got the better of them. His subsequent missives to
Hawkesbury reinforced the impression of a country hostile to its French alliance, but fearful to
show this too openly due to the continued presence of French forces. Like Cornwallis at Amiens,
Liston explained any apparent reluctance on the part of the Dutch government to fall into line
with Britain as the result of a need to keep up appearances, especially in light of the French
ambassador’s tendency to ascribe any resistance to French whim to rampant ‘Anglomania’.74
The continued presence of French troops in the Netherlands was a major stumbling block to
Britain’s successful pursuit of its Dutch agenda. Despite the best efforts of the Batavian govern-
ment, these troops were not removed at the conclusion of peace. As early as April 1802
Schimmelpenninck requested that the First Consul should adhere to treaty obligations and with-
draw his forces, and this was followed by repeated requests from the Batavian Ministry of War.75
All demands were ignored. When the Dutch government tried to force the issue by threatening
to stop paying for French soldiers, Napoleon simply replied that he hoped that they would not
be foolish enough to ‘expose themselves to the danger of the disorders that might be commit-
ted by soldiers left without pay’.76 Whitworth in Paris was instructed to remonstrate with the
French government on this point, and to alert them to their obligations under the Treaties of
The Hague, Luneville, and the Franco-Dutch convention of August 1801.77 Napoleon, however,
remained unmoved. By early 1803 Liston advised Hawkesbury that van der Goes had decided to
go along with French wishes to keep a garrison in the Netherlands for the time being, as to do
so was preferable to perhaps provoking a change of government as had been seen in
Switzerland.78 It was clear, therefore, that Britain’s hopes of wresting an independent Batavian
Republic from France’s grasp had been checked by Napoleon’s refusal – in contravention of trea-
ties – to allow the Netherlands to accede to de facto independence. This issue, along with
Napoleon’s treatment of Piedmont, Parma and Switzerland, quickly soured relations between the
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two major powers, and the Netherlands became once more an issue of Anglo-French
negotiation.79
That Britain had a right to intervene in continental affairs in the months after the signing of
the Treaty of Amiens was, to Hawkesbury, not in doubt. Although Britain had not been a party
to any of the treaties regulating Franco-Dutch relations, her government considered that the
Treaty of Amiens gave tacit sanction to the status quo prevailing at the time of its conclusion.80
Hawkesbury outlined his thinking regarding the Netherlands to Whitworth: ‘His Majesty has a
particular right to interfere on the present occasion, as he consented to make numerous and
most important restitutions to the Batavian government in the treaty of peace, on the consider-
ation of that government being independent and not being subject to foreign control.’81 This
was therefore not treaty revisionism, or a delayed realisation that too much had been conceded
at Amiens. Rather, the British government believed that Amiens afforded continued rights and
opportunities to interpose into European affairs. It was the closing down of these avenues of
connection that drove Britain to a more hostile stance towards France as 1802 drew to a close.
3
The attempts to avert a return of war in early 1803 give a final demonstration of the fact that
the British government had not simply surrendered its hopes of continental influence at Amiens.
In response to Napoleon’s refusal to withdraw from the Netherlands, and to his unilateral
reorganisation of Switzerland and parts of Italy, Addington took the provocative step of ordering
British forces to remain in Malta, in direct breach of the Treaty of Amiens. To the self-righteous
French protests, Britain replied with a demand that France should evacuate the Netherlands and
Switzerland in line with its treaty obligations, as well as giving Britain the right to retain forces in
Malta for a decade as compensation for the expansion of French influence since the prelimina-
ries. Napoleon rejected these demands more-or-less out of hand, and also made strenuous
efforts to deflect criticism that he had breached the Treaties of The Hague and Luneville by tell-
ing foreign representatives that he intended to evacuate the Netherlands, but only once Britain
had adhered to the letter of the Treaty of Amiens.82
The rejection of Britain’s proposal has been seen as an example of Napoleon’s subordination
of French interests to his own megalomaniac tendencies, or at the very least as an act of wanton
provocation.83 In Schroeder’s view, Britain’s demands would have effectively given their sanction
to Napoleon’s wider expansionism in Germany and Italy, and would not have compromised
French political control of the Netherlands. Grainger too believed that withdrawing his forces
‘would have cost Bonaparte little or nothing’.84 However, this is perhaps to misunderstand the
attitudes of both Britain and France to the Netherlands in 1803. Both the British cabinet and
Napoleon believed that the removal of French troops would spell the beginning of the end for
French dominance in the Netherlands. Just as London had received manifold proofs of Dutch
disenchantment with France, so Napoleon’s agents in the Netherlands had provided a litany of
complaints of behaviour and attitudes that favoured Britain. According to French records, a
majority of Dutch ministers and Councillors of State, including van der Goes, and all of the colo-
nial governors, were seen as either staunchly anti-French or as partisans of Britain.85 Only a few
men at the top of the Dutch government, such as G.F. Pyman and Willem Six, could be relied
upon to support a continued French alliance. This is not to suggest that the Batavian govern-
ment did seek a British connection; the internal correspondence and instructions to Dutch repre-
sentatives abroad shows that they remained wary of Britain, and sought only neutrality and
continued continental peace that would allow the re-establishment of prosperity.86 However, this
was not the perception of either of the Netherlands’ neighbours. In this context, the insistence
on the removal of French troops would have been interpreted by Napoleon as Britain flexing its
diplomatic muscles. His refusal to withdraw from the Netherlands was therefore based at least
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partly on strategic principle of containing Britain, rather than simply because of an incorrigibly
aggressive and expansionist nature.87
The fact that Britain made explicit demands for Dutch independence and the withdrawal of
French troops in 1802-3, when she had not done so at Amiens, was not down to any change in
policy or sudden desire to right the wrongs of a flawed peace. Rather, it was a pragmatic
response to the failure of their post-treaty diplomacy. At Amiens, as has been argued above, the
British government was content to leave the question of the status of the Netherlands to be
implicitly regulated by previous Franco-Dutch treaties, which clearly provided for Dutch inde-
pendence and the removal of French troops. This would provide the basis for Britain’s policy of
pursuing renewed continental connections. Napoleon’s refusal to adhere to these accords meant
that British diplomacy was left largely impotent, and left London needing to tie the First Consul
into a much stronger commitment to respect Dutch independence, or at least to force his hand
in acknowledging his breach of faith. Although the method of execution differed significantly,
Britain’s policy remained consistent.
Whether London genuinely believed that Napoleon might agree to their demands at this
stage is a moot point. A number of historians, Schroeder and Esdaile amongst them, have con-
cluded that Napoleon lacked the temperament to accept limitations on his ambition, and that
his inability to show restraint and integrity meant that other powers would frequently feel that
there was no option other than conflict to try to limit his expansionism.88 Hawkesbury was not
necessarily confident in the prospect of continued peace, writing to Liston in March 1803 that
‘considering the character of the person we have to deal with, it is extremely difficult to calculate
with precision, the probability of the renewal of hostilities’.89 What is clear, however, is that by
May 1803 both Britain and France were using the French military presence in the Netherlands as
a bargaining chip in their negotiations. For Britain, the removal of French troops was a precondi-
tion to any further concessions. For France, the evacuation of the Netherlands was contingent
on Britain upholding the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens – although whether Napoleon
would have consented to remove his troops even then is debatable.90 The positions were irre-
concilable. From Britain’s point of view Napoleon’s actions in Italy, Switzerland and Germany
could not be permitted without suitable balancing compensation, while Napoleon wished to use
the current crisis to force Britain to accept exclusion from continental affairs. Britain’s tacit
acceptance of the continental settlement in 1802 was predicated on the idea that there
remained room for British influence to operate in French satellite states, notably the Netherlands.
Napoleon did not understand this traditional interpretation of international diplomatic norms,
and his refusal to allow the full independence of his allies meant that in 1803 Britain had to
demand more explicit concessions or face a renewal of war.
The declaration of war by Britain on France on 18 May 1803 signalled, of course, the failure of
the Peace of Amiens. But it did not necessarily mean that the thinking behind the peace had
been fundamentally flawed. While Britain had made significant concessions, it had also expected
to be able to make significant diplomatic advances once a treaty was in place. Regarding the
Netherlands, Britain had believed that in normal diplomatic intercourse, she could get more from
peace than from continuing the war. The renewal of hostilities was therefore a recognition not
of a fatally unstable treaty, but of the fact that in French-dominated Europe normal diplomatic
intercourse had become almost impossible. The refusal to accept peace on these terms can be
understood as the rejection of appeasement of Napoleon’s expansionism, but it does not mean
that Amiens had been a misbegotten attempt to appease.
Even when committed to a renewed war, Britain did make one final effort to separate the
Netherlands from Napoleon’s grasp. The Batavian Republic was omitted from the declaration of
war in May 1803, and Britain let it be known that it would accept Dutch neutrality in the coming
conflict if France withdrew its troops and respected Dutch independence. In these desires they
were heartily seconded by the Dutch government, who begged the First Consul to allow them
to remain aloof from the Anglo-French contretemps.91 Their pleas were refused. For the next
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decade, the Netherlands would be forced fight a war in which she had no interest, as an increas-
ingly reluctant French confederate.
Conclusion
This article has offered a reassessment of the Treaty of Amiens, and has suggested that despite
the apparent one-sidedness of the terms, it did not represent the exclusion of Britain from con-
tinental Europe. By examining Britain’s relations with the Netherlands, it can be seen that the
treaty provided an opportunity for Britain to achieve by diplomacy that which she had failed to
attain by force of arms. Amiens was not a moment of appeasement; it was, instead, a pragmatic
acceptance of the futility of continuing an increasingly counterproductive conflict. It neither
sanctioned future French expansion, nor accepted eternal French dominance over its allies. By
understanding Amiens in the context of other treaties such as The Hague and Luneville, it can
be seen that Britain expected peace to bring the genuine independence of France’s satellite
states, above all the Netherlands. By understanding Britain’s historical connections to the
Netherlands – both the experience of expelling French influence in 1787, and the assumption
that the Dutch remained at core natural friends to Britain – it can be seen that London was justi-
fied in expecting Dutch independence to lead gradually but naturally to a closer Anglo-Dutch
understanding. While the actual clauses of the Treaty of Amiens offered thin fare to Britain,
London’s belief that she could reverse some of France’s dominance through diplomacy once
good relations had been re-established places a different complexion on the peace. When
Napoleon shattered the illusion that he would allow his allies genuine independence and it
became clear that revision through diplomacy was impossible, Britain fell reluctantly back into
war. To have failed to do so would indeed have been appeasement.
This article is not meant as an apologia for British ministers, or to suggest that their conduct
made the best of their situation. Despite the foregoing, it is clear that in 1801-3 Addington,
Hawkesbury and the wider cabinet badly misjudged the situation, and that their desperation for
peace made them wilfully blind to the significance of changing circumstances between the sign-
ing of the preliminaries and the final treaty. Although they mistrusted Napoleon, they continued
to treat him as a rational and even traditional diplomatic actor until it was too late. They, and
indeed Pitt and Grenville in 1800, also failed to concert adequately with other powers, notably
Austria, in both making peace and binding France to her treaty obligations. All of these charges,
and perhaps more, can be laid at their doors. Yet to accuse them of either ignoring Britain’s
security, as some contemporaries did, or of abandoning hopes of British influence in Western
Europe in 1801-2 would be to misread the diplomatic possibilities that the Treaty of Amiens
ultimately afforded.
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